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Abstract
Participatory Democracy is a process of collective decision making
that combines elements from both Direct and Representative Democ-
racy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy and politicians as-
sume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to
understand how Participatory Democracy operates, and to study its
implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the
final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model in-
spired by the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in
the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, that builds on the model of meetings
with costly participation by Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000).
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"We are not selling the illusion of the direct democracy in the
Greek plaza which, let us bear in mind, was not the democracy of
the all but the democracy of the best."
Olivio Dutra, first Workers Party mayor of Porto Alegre.
1 Introduction
Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that com-
bines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have
the power to decide on policy and politicians assume the role of policy im-
plementation. The electorate can monitor politicians’ performance simply
by comparing citizens’ proposals with the policies actually implemented. As
a result, the discretion of politicians is severely constrained. In this system,
the extent to which citizens can aﬀect policy and determine social priorities
is directly aligned with the degree to which they choose to involve themselves
in the process.1
Real life experiences of participatory democracy have mainly materialized
in processes of "Participatory Budgeting" at the city level. This is the case of
nearly two hundred Brazilian municipalities where direct democracy, in the
form of popular assemblies, coexists with formal political parties and local
elections: citizens have to make a budget proposal but they also have to elect
the city executive and legislative bodies. Other participatory systems have
been implemented at the state level in Rio Grande del Sul (Brazil) and in
West Bengal and Kerala (India), and at the school level in Chicago, through
the Local School Councils2.
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to analyze a theoretical model
of participatory democracy. We want to understand how this institutional
arrangement operates, and to study its influence over the behavior of citizens
1Although inspired by earlier figures such as Rousseau or John Stuart Mill, the first
theoretical formulations of participatory democracy were made during the 70s by Pateman
(1970) and MacPherson (1977). An excellent discussion of the main features of this model
of democracy can be found in Held (1987).
2For a more detailed description of these cases, see Fung and Wright (2001) and the
references therein.
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and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a
formal model inspired by the experience of the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre,
the most successful and lasting real example of Participatory Budgeting.
Our second goal is precisely to discuss the application of this system to
the particular case of Porto Alegre. The results of the formal analysis allow
us to construct an explanation for the political events ocurred in that city
during the period in which the Participatory Budgeting system has been
operating.
Participatory democracy and the experience of Porto Alegre must be of
interest to economists for several reasons. On the one hand, Economics
has exclusively focused on more traditional models of democracy like di-
rect democracy and, above all, representative democracy, since the latter is
the prevailing system in the Western world. But the success of the men-
tioned real life examples of participatory democracy on both economic and
social grounds3 demands an evaluation of its potential virtues and flaws. The
present paper represents a first step in that direction. On the other hand,
two facts occurred in Porto Alegre escape obvious rational explanation: the
substantial participation at meetings, despite the explicit costs of attendance,
and that the policies implemented under this system have consistently fol-
lowed the citizens’ proposals. Our formal analysis sheds light on these issues.
In particular, we characterize participation at the meetings, in terms of pref-
erences of the attendees, and oﬀer a theoretical explanation for the increasing
participation rates observed in Porto Alegre. We also oﬀer an analysis of the
government’s incentives to fulfill the society’s claims under this system.
1.1 Overview of the model
The process of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre can be described as
an annual cyclical process that consists of three stages: a deliberation stage,
a negotiation stage, and a monitoring stage. In the deliberation stage citizens
may participate in assemblies to decide on the investment priorities of their
3On the positive social and economic consequences of participatory democracy, see Fung
(2001), Santos (1998) and the report on Participatory Budgeting of the Inter-American
Development Bank (2003).
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neighborhood and to vote for the representatives who will present and defend
the assemblies’ decisions in front of the city government. In the negotiation
stage, the city government and the representatives from all neighborhoods
determine the city investment plan. After the Municipal Budget has been
approved by the city government, the representatives of each neighborhood
monitor the execution of the investment plan4. Hence, the main institu-
tional characteristics of this system are (i) the combination of elements of
representative democracy -elected municipal bodies- with elements of direct
democracy -assemblies; and (ii) the high degree of accountability due to the
direct involvement of citizens in the process.
In order to take these features on board, our analysis builds on the model
of pure direct democracy by Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (2000) (referred
to as ORT henceforth). There, the members of a society decide independently
whether to attend, at a cost, or not to a meeting, where the policy decision
taken will be a compromise among the attendees’ ideal positions. Attendance
is based on a cost-benefit calculation: citizens compare the cost of partici-
pation with the impact that their presence will have on the compromise.
We extend the ORT model by considering the existence of a representative
or legislator who is in charge of policy implementation. The legislator can
choose freely the policy to be implemented. We assume that the legislator
has her own preferences over policies and she also cares about reelection.
Notice that the roles played here by citizens and representatives diﬀer
from the roles they play in a standard model of representative democracy.
In our model of participatory democracy, citizens are the first ones to move
by making a policy proposal, and representatives have to react to it, decid-
ing whether to implement it or not. In a standard model of representative
democracy the policy decision is made by the elected representatives and the
electorate reacts to it, approving or disapproving the policy choice with their
vote in future elections5.
4A more detailed description of this process may be found in Appendix 1.
5In order to emphasize this diﬀerence we can draw an analogy to Stackelberg’s model of
oligopoly: in the model of participatory democracy citizens play the role of the leader and
representatives play the role of the follower, while in a model of representative democracy
citizens are followers and representatives are leaders. The analogy is not perfect though,
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Even though the process of Participatory Budgeting is a yearly process,
citizens only reelect legislators every 4 years. Thus it is natural to assume
that, when electing the legislator, citizens vote retrospectively6: before a
formal election takes place, citizens evaluate a legislator according to her
performance in each of the budgeting decisions that took place during the
legislative period. In order to simplify the model, we consider a reduced form
game in which one period policy choice represents the whole set of decisions
taken by a legislator during a legislature.
In particular, we assume that citizens reward those legislators that im-
plement policies proposed by the citizens’ assembly by reelecting them; and
punish those who do not take the assembly’s proposals into account by not
reelecting them. This retrospective voting rule seems to fit well the behavior
of citizens involved in a process of participatory democracy.7 By agreeing
on a policy proposal at the assembly, citizens resolve the conflict of interests
due to the heterogeneity of their policy preferences. And, at the time of
deciding on the reelection of the legislator, they only need to evaluate his
performance by comparing the policies they proposed and the policy choices
of the legislator. Thus, society’s preferences with respect to the performance
of the legislator may be considered to be homogeneous8. Nevertheless, since
we assume that both, citizens and the legislator, care about the policy im-
because here citizens move yet again at the end.
6There exists some theories of voting which suggest that voters base their decision on
past performance of parties. This literature starts with Downs’ (1957) theory according
to which, parties’ past performance is the cheapest way for voters to predict future perfor-
mance. It continues with the reward-punishment theory proposed by Key (1966), and with
the empirical studies by Fiorina (1981), among others. Other models and applications of
retrospective voting include: Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Alesina and Rosenthal (1989),
Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
7For instance, in Porto Alegre there are committees formed by elected delegates whose
function is to supervise the implementation of the budget. Since they have the right to
ask the city government for detailed explanations on each investment work, any deviation
that cannot be explained by sound technical or economic criteria may have straightforward
electoral consequences.
8An alternative justification for this assumption comes from a veil-of-ignorance-like
argument: Uncertainty can make citizens ignore their future opinions in the forthcoming
budgeting decisions. Hence, they will prefer to keep in oﬃce a legislator that follows
citizens’ proposals even though at a given period, some of them would have been better
oﬀ had the legislator ignored the corresponding proposal.
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plemented, the conflict between the legislator’s and the citizens’s preferences
allows for the possibility of a variety of equilibria.9 Hence, citizens in this
model punish the legislator if they do not approve of her performance by not
coordinating their votes for her in future elections; otherwise they reward
the legislator by reelecting her. This assumption captures the high degree of
accountability in participatory democracy mentioned above.
More specifically, we model the system of participatory democracy as a
game in three stages. In the first stage, each citizen decides whether to attend
or not to attend a meeting in which a policy proposal will be decided. In the
second stage, citizens who attend the meeting come out with a policy repre-
senting their interests and their delegates make a proposal to the legislator,
aimed at making her implement the assembly’s choice. In the third stage,
the legislator decides the policy to be implemented, taking into account the
reduced form game that includes her chances of reelection.
In order to find the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategies of this game,
we analyze the optimal choices of the players by backward induction. First,
we analyze the optimal reaction of the legislator in terms of policy choices,
to a given proposal made by the delegates. Then, we analyze the optimal
proposal of the assembly’s delegates, for a given distribution of preferences of
the attendees, and taking into account the optimal reaction of the legislator.
Finally, we analyze the optimal decision of each citizen regarding whether to
attend the meeting, given an optimal play of all agents in the continuation
of the game.
9The important diﬀerences between the present paper and the recent developments in
the theory of political agency make comparisons diﬃcult. First, these papers often study
voters’ decision problems from a moral hazard or an adverse selection perspective (see
Ferejohn (1986) and Besley and Case (1995) respectively) or by combining both (Banks
and Sundaram, 1998). On the contrary, in our model voters can perfectly monitor the
legislator actions and preferences. But beyond this, the retention rule in this literature
is often imposed, as in Ferejohn (1986), and always set costlessly. In our case, although
a rule is given, its actual enforcement depends upon citizens costly participation in the
meeting.
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1.2 Overview of the results
Following the intuition of the retrospective voting models, our first result
shows that the set of policies that can be implemented in equilibrium is a
subset of the policy space that contains the ideal point of the legislator.
That is, the legislator will only implement policies that are close to her ideal
point up to a maximal compromise policy, at which point the legislator is
indiﬀerent between jeopardizing her reelection by implementing her ideal
policy, or guaranteeing her reelection by satisfying the assembly. We show
that the more the legislator cares about holding oﬃce the larger is the set
of policies that can be implemented in equilibrium. The intuition is clear:
a legislator who does not care so much about policy is willing to accept
proposals further from her ideal point in order to guarantee a sure win in a
future election. On the other hand, the softer is the threat of punishment,
the smaller the size of the set of implementable policies. That is, a legislator
who believes that her chances of being reelected will be very low unless she
follows the policy proposed by the assembly, will be willing to implement a
larger set of policies.
As in the ORT model, if the cost of attending the meeting is high enough
there is a unique equilibrium in which nobody attends the meeting, but
otherwise in equilibrium there is always some attendance.
In our model, the legislator’s ideal policy plays a role similar to the default
policy in ORT: it is the policy selected if no citizen attends the meeting.
There exists, however, a crucial diﬀerence. In our model, the legislator has
decision power and in equilibrium she will never compromise more than what
is needed to ensure her reelection. We find that in equilibrium only citizens
who are far enough from the legislator’s ideal point attend the meeting.
But they are not necessarily extreme in the usual (spatial) sense: when the
legislator has extreme policy preferences, citizens who are moderate relative
to the spectrum of tastes in society may actually have strong incentives to
participate. Moderation becomes thus a relative concept.
The results we obtain show the relevance of two features: 1) the alignment
between the policy preferences of the legislator and the policy preferences of
7
society; and 2) the degree of extremism of the legislator.
On the one hand, we show that when the most preferred outcome to
the society lies relatively close to the legislator’s ideal point, that is, when
society and legislator’s preferences are aligned, the policy implemented in
equilibrium is the assembly’s most preferred policy. This equilibrium exists
only for a certain subset of distribution of preferences.
On the other hand, we find that for any distribution of preferences if the
legislator is extremist relative to the society’s preferences there is an equilib-
rium in which the legislator implements the maximal compromise policy: on
her left if her ideal point is on the right hand side of the policy space and
on her right if her ideal point is on the left hand side of the policy space. In
this equilibrium only one citizen attends the meeting: with an ideal point to
the left of the legislator if the legislator is rightist, and with an ideal point to
the right of the legislator if the legislator is leftist. This result is driven by
the combination of two facts: 1) the legislator will never compromise more
than what is necessary to guarantee her reelection, and 2) each citizen that
attends the meeting is assumed to have an impact on the proposed policy.
Therefore, in our model, only one citizen, even a moderate, may be enough
to force an extreme legislator to a maximal compromise.
This result should not be taken literally. A real life interpretation of each
citizen as defined in our model could be a community association. In fact,
today about six hundred community associations are established and active
in Porto Alegre10, and the members of these associations account for a large
proportion of the participation in the popular assemblies. Since it makes
sense to identify each such community association with a particular position
in the policy space, we can interpret our extreme result on attendance as
an equilibrium in which only members of one community association attend
the meeting. It still refers to a very low participation result but not an
implausible one: it does not refer to one individual having a large impact on
the legislator’s choice but to the members of an organized group forcing the
10The high number of politically active community associations is one feature that ex-
plains the introduction of the system of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil.
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legislator to a maximal compromise policy.11
We show that the two equilibria described above are the only pure strat-
egy equilibria that may be obtained in our model. If the legislator is extremist
and her preferences are not aligned with society’s the maximal compromise
equilibrium is unique. If the legislator is extremist and her preferences are
aligned with society’s, for some distribution of preferences we have another
equilibrium in which the policy outcome coincides with the most preferred
choice of the assembly. Finally, if the legislator is relatively moderate and
her preferences are not aligned with society’s we find that there is no equilib-
rium in pure strategies. Therefore, with polarized or extremist societies and
moderate legislators, the process of participatory democracy may generate
unstable outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes
the formal model. Section 3 presents the sequential derivation of optimal
policy choices. Section 4 analyzes the citizens’ choice on participation in the
assemblies. Section 5 analyzes the evidence from Porto Alegre in the light
of the results obtained in the previous sections. Finally, Section 6 contains
some concluding remarks. All proofs can be found in Appendix 2.
2 The model
The policy space is continuous and one dimensional, and represented by
the interval [0, 1]. There is a finite number N of citizens with single-peak
preferences over the interval [0, 1]. The citizens’ ideal points are distributed
according to a probability distribution F (θ) with support in [0, 1]. We will
assume, without loss of generality, that there is always at least one citizen
with ideal point θi = 0 and at least one citizen with ideal point θi = 1.
Given that the high degree of involvement of citizens in the process of
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre has been induced by the strong
activism of community associations, and since, by definition, their members
share a common interest, we can also think of citizens in our model as diﬀerent
11In fact, it is a common practice for associations to send one or two members to the
assembly meetings and to take turns.
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community associations.
At the first stage of the game, citizens have to decide whether to attend
a meeting in which a policy will be proposed. Attendance implies that their
opinion will be taken into account in the elaboration of that policy proposal,
but it also involves an individual cost 0 < c < 1
2
. This may include trans-
portation costs, the opportunity cost of the time spent in the assembly or
the cost of identifying the own preferences. The welfare of a citizen i with
ideal point θi depends on the policy implemented and on whether he attends
the meeting and it is given by the following expression:
Vi(x, ai) = − |x− θi|− aic,
where x is the policy implemented, and ai represents the decision of citizen i
on whether to attend the meeting: if ai = 1, i attends the meeting and pays
a cost c, if ai = 0, i does not attend the meeting and pays no cost.
Following the functioning of the Participatory Budgeting system in Porto
Alegre, where citizens rank and select their priorities, we assume that the
citizens who attend the meeting aggregate their preferences according to
some previously fixed aggregation rule and that the policy selected by that
rule is the one that the assembly would like to see implemented. Let X
denote the list of ideal points of those citizens who attend the meeting, |X|
the number of attendees, and let θ∗ (X) denote the assembly’s most preferred
policy. The aggregation rule we consider is
θ∗ (X) =
(
median (X) if |X| is odd
m1+m2
2
otherwise
where m1 and m2 are the two medians’ ideal points when |X| is even.12
Given a distribution of ideal points of the citizens, F (θ), let θ∗∗ denote
society’s most preferred policy defined according to the corresponding aggre-
12We are of course aware of the fact that with an even number of attendees the choice
of this policy cannot be rationalized by a voting process within the assembly. However,
this assumption allows us to pin down a unique compromise regardless of the number of
participants .
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gation rule. That is, θ∗∗ would be the assembly’s decision if all individuals
participate in the assembly. Notice that the policy chosen by the assembly at
the meeting does not depend on F (θ), but on the distribution of ideal points
of the citizens who decide to attend the meeting, X.
After the assembly, a proposal, considered as the "general will", is trans-
mitted to a legislator who is in charge of implementing the final policy. In
Porto Alegre, two bodies formed by delegates elected by citizens at the as-
semblies are in charge of doing this. Hence, we assume the existence of an
intermediate body of delegates between the citizens and the legislator who
elaborates the policy proposal, denoted by x∗. We assume that the delegates’
utility function coincides with the assembly’s one so they try to induce the
legislator to implement a policy as close as possible to θ∗.13 This implies that
the policy proposal to the legislator, x∗, does not need to coincide with the
assembly’s most preferred policy θ∗; it is an strategic choice that takes into
account the distortion introduced by the legislator.
The welfare of the legislator depends on her own policy preferences and
on the probability of being reelected, and it is represented by a convex com-
bination as follows:
VL(x
∗, x) = (1− α)P (x∗, x)− α |x− θL| .
where θL ∈ [0, 1] represents the ideal point of the legislator, α ∈ [0, 1] is an
exogenous parameter that represents the intensity of the policy preferences
of the legislator relative to her preferences for holding oﬃce. From the point
of view of the legislator, P (x∗, x) is interpreted as the probability with which
she will be reelected. It depends on the amount of support that she will
be able to obtain from the population, which in turn depends on whether
the citizens approve of her performance. As mentioned, citizens judge the
legislator’ performance according to how close her choice x is from the general
will represented by their proposal to her, x∗. In particular, we assume that the
probability of reelection P (x∗, x) is a step function of the distance between
13See footnote 16 on the plausibility of this assumption.
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the implemented policy x and the mandate of the citizens’ assembly x∗:
P (x∗, x) =
(
1 if |x− x∗| ≤ B
ε otherwise
where B > 0 is the degree of discretion of the legislator, that may account
for financial or technical circumstances unforeseen by the citizens. In partici-
patory democracy, legislators still control this knowledge and have privileged
access to it.14 So if the diﬀerence between the policy proposed by the del-
egates and the policy implemented by the legislator is not larger than this
degree of discretion B, citizens will approve the legislator’s performance and
they will likely reelect her in future elections. Otherwise, the reelection of
the legislator is compromised and we assume that she will only win future
elections with probability ε, with 0 < ε < 1. We assume that ε takes small
values, reflecting the high degree of accountability of the participatory pro-
cess15.
Finally, if nobody attends the meeting the legislator can implement her
ideal point and she is reelected with probability one.
time
Individual
attendance
 decision
Assembly
chooses θ*
Delegates
propose x*  to
the legislator
Legislator
implements
x
Legislator is
reelected with
P(x*,x)
Figure 2: Timing of the game.
So far, we have constructed a game in three stages. In the first stage,
citizens decide whether to attend or not to attend the meeting. In the second
stage citizens who attend the meeting choose a policy and the delegates make
a proposal to the legislator. In the third stage the legislator decides which
policy will be finally implemented.
14In Porto Alegre, there have been substantial eﬀorts to train delegates and councillors
aiming to reduce this inevitable degree of discretion.
15The discrete form for P (x∗, x) can be dropped without qualitatively changing the
results. Section 6 contains a discussion on the eﬀects of employing continuous functional
forms.
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3 Optimal policy choices
In order to find the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium strategies of this game,
we analyze in this Section the optimal choices of the players by backward
induction, starting with the optimal reaction of the legislator, in terms of
policy choices, to a given proposal made by the delegates. Then, we analyze
the optimal proposal of the assembly’s delegates for a given distribution of
preferences of the attendees, taking into account the optimal reaction of the
legislator. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium policy choice for any pair
of legislator’s and assembly’s policy preferences, (θL, θ
∗).
3.1 The optimal choice of the legislator
In order to choose the policy that will be finally implemented, x, the legislator
maximizes her payoﬀ function, given a policy proposed by the delegates, x∗.
max
x
VL(x
∗, x) = (1− α)P (x∗, x)− α |x− θL|
where P (x∗, x) =
(
1 if |x− x∗| ≤ B
ε otherwise
Let us define b = (1−α)
α
(1− ε) . Notice that (1− ε) represents the proba-
bility with which the legislator is not reelected when the citizens feel deceived,
and (1−α)
α
represents the value of holding oﬃce. Thus, b represents a mea-
sure of the cost that the legislator has to pay when she is punished by the
electorate. Straightforward computations allow us to characterize the best
response of the legislator That is,
x (x∗) =



x∗ +B if B ≤ |x∗ − θL| ≤ b+B and x∗ ≤ θL
x∗ −B if B ≤ |x∗ − θL| ≤ b+B and x∗ ≥ θL
θL otherwise
The intuition behind this function can be easily grasped: The legislator
is forced to face a trade-oﬀ when maximizing his objective function.
Consider first the case in which the delegates’ proposal is very close to
13
the legislator’s ideal point, i.e. |x∗ − θL| < b+B. In that case, the legislator
can implement her ideal point without compromising her reelection. Simi-
larly, when |x∗ − θL| > B, the delegates’ proposal is so far away from the
legislator’s ideal point, that she prefers to ignore the proposal even though
that implies jeopardizing reelection. Only in the remaining case the proposal
of the delegates is far enough from the legislator’s ideal point, so she cannot
implement her ideal point without compromising her approval, but it is close
enough for the legislator to prefer to compromise and thus guarantee a sure
victory in the future.
Hence, the optimal policy choice of the legislator will be the legislator’s
ideal point θL, if the proposal of the assembly is not further than a distance B
from it, or if the legislator cares mostly about policy (b is suﬃciently small).
Otherwise the legislator will choose a policy that is located exactly B away
from the proposal of the assembly.
3.2 The optimal choice of the delegates
The policy proposal x∗ is made by a small group of delegates. Since they
are elected by the assembly we assume they are committed to force the
legislator to implement θ∗ or the closest possible policy16. But they are aware
of the preferences of the legislator so they choose their policy proposal x∗
strategically, knowing that the only policies that can be finally implemented
are either the legislator’s ideal point or policies that are exactly B away
from their proposal. The optimal policy choice of the delegates can be then
16The strength of the bond between the delegates and the regions they represent has
been a source of certain unrest in Porto Alegre: CIDADE, a NGO monitoring the pro-
cess, has reported problems and discussions about delegates who allegedly took positions
without consulting their constituencies or who failed to report back decisions at higher
levels. Nevertheless, the strong accountability and the reelection rules employed have tem-
pered the potential for collusion and corruption. Surveys show that over the 85% of the
population thinks that delegates "always" or "most of the time" represent properly the
assemblies’ interests (CIDADE, 2002).
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characterized by the following function:
x∗ (θ∗) =



θL − b−B if θ∗ ≤ θL − b
θ∗ −B if θL − b ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL
θ∗ +B if θL ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL + b
θL + b+B if θL + b ≤ θ∗
In the second and third cases, the assembly’s most preferred policy is very
close to the legislator’s ideal point, i.e. |θL − θ∗| ≤ b, and the delegates can
induce the legislator to implement the assembly’s most preferred policy by
making proposals B away from θ∗.17 Otherwise, the best the delegates can do
is to induce a compromise. The best choice in this case is to propose a policy
that makes the legislator indiﬀerent between implementing her ideal point
and jeopardizing the next election, and implementing the compromise policy
that still assures her approval, that is, a policy of maximal compromise.
3.3 The equilibrium policy choice
By combining the optimal choices of delegates and legislator we can charac-
terize the policies that will be implemented in equilibrium as a function of
the legislator’s ideal point and the most preferred policy of the assembly. The
next Proposition presents the most immediate consequence of introducing a
legislator’s choice in a process of pure direct democracy: not all policies are
implementable in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium x ∈ [θL − b, θL + b].
This result could be seen as equivalent to imposing an exogenous restric-
tion on the policy space; and it is so, strictly speaking. But these restrictions
are not arbitrary. As in the retrospective voting models, they come from the
legislator’s preferences over policies and reelection. Note that the size of the
set of implementable policies depends positively on b = (1−α)
α
(1 − ε). And
17Note that the role of B ultimately boils down to the level of distortion that citizens
need to introduce in their proposals. Therefore, it might be set to zero.
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this is in turn increasing on the value that the legislator attaches to hold-
ing oﬃce (α), and decreasing in the probability with which the legislator’s
performance is approved independently of the policy implemented (ε).
These relations are intuitive: legislators who do not care so much about
policy are willing to accept proposals further from their ideal point in order
to stay in oﬃce. By the same token, a legislator who believes that her chances
of being reelected will be very low unless she follows the policy proposed by
the assembly, will be ready to compromise. In fact, if citizens could commit
to a certain degree of punishment, in terms of the probability represented by
ε, their optimal choice should be ε = 0, the maximal degree of accountability.
Finally, the combination of all the previous derivations and assumptions
allow us to derive a function mapping any pair of legislator’s and assembly’s
policy preferences, (θL, θ
∗) into a unique policy outcome x:18
x (θ∗, θL) =



θ∗ if θ∗ ∈ [θL − b, θL + b]
θL − b if θ∗ < θL − b
θL + b if θ
∗ > θL + b
When the policy most preferred by the assembly is relatively close to the
legislator’s ideal point, the policy finally implemented coincides exactly with
the preferences of the assembly. Otherwise, citizens cannot induce the legis-
lator to implement their most preferred policy. They can at most induce a
compromise between the policy preferences of the assembly and the legisla-
tor. Moreover, the less the legislator cares about policy and the higher the
probability with which she is being punished by the citizens, the smaller the
chances are that the assembly can achieve its most preferred policy. In fact,
if the values of α and ε are suﬃciently small (so that b is large enough) the
set of implementable policies may be the whole policy space.
18The derivation of this function can be found in the proof of Proposition 1.
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4 Endogenous participation
In this Section, we finally analyze citizens’ attendance decisions, taking as
given the equilibrium policy choice derived above that embeds the optimal
play of all agents in the continuation of the game.
In this subgame, an equilibrium is a list of values for {a1, ..., aN} with ai ∈
{0, 1} such that for all i, ai is a best response against {a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., aN}.
We show that when the cost of attendance is large enough, relative to the
parameters of the objective function of the legislator, there is a unique equi-
librium in which nobody attends the meeting.
Proposition 2 (Non Attendance) If c > b there is a unique equilibrium
in which nobody attends the meeting.
As in ORT model, here citizens perform a cost benefit analysis in order
to decide whether to attend the meeting. If the cost of attending is larger
than the benefit they will obtain from the impact that their presence at the
meeting will have on the final policy, they decide not to attend. We have
assumed that if nobody attends the meeting the legislator can implement her
ideal point without compromising her future reelection. Thus, in this model
the size of b represents the maximal eﬀect that any citizen can have on the
policy implemented. Clearly, when the cost of attendance is larger than b
nobody has any incentive to attend the meeting.
Next we show that when this is not the case, that is, if the cost of atten-
dance is small enough, in equilibrium there must be some positive attendance.
Proposition 3 If c < b, then no-attendance is not an equilibrium.
In fact, the proof of Proposition 3 shows not only that nobody attending
is not an equilibrium, but also that if nobody attends the meeting any citizen
whose ideal point is more than a distance c away from the legislator’s ideal
point would be better oﬀ attending. The intuition of this result comes again
from the cost-benefit analysis that citizens perform: any citizen who attends
the meeting can induce the legislator to implement either the citizen’s ideal
point or a maximal compromise policy (a policy that is a distance b away
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from the legislator’s ideal point). In both cases, if the ideal point of the
citizen is more than a distance c away from θL, the benefit for the citizen is
larger than c, which is the cost of attending the meeting.19
Next we characterize some equilibrium strategies when c < b, that is,
when there are some citizens who attend the meeting in equilibrium.
4.1 Aligned moderate legislators
Let us assume that the distribution of ideal points of society, F (θ), is sym-
metric around the legislator’s ideal point. This will better illustrate the
cost-benefit analysis citizens have to perform when making their attendance
choices. In this case, the legislator’s policy preferences qualify as moderate
and aligned with society’s. Notice that when we assume a distribution of
citizens’ ideal points that is symmetric around θL, we must have that θL = 12
given that we have assumed that there is at least one citizen with ideal point
θi = 0 and at least one citizen with ideal point θi = 1.
Given the symmetry assumed in the structure of the game, we will look
for equilibria with symmetric distributions of attendees, that is, an equi-
librium strategy profile {a1, ..., aN} such that the distribution of the ideal
points of the attendees is symmetric around θ∗. Since we must have θL = 12 ,
in this equilibrium the policy preferred by the assembly coincides with the
ideal point of the legislator, with the implemented policy, and with the most
preferred policy of the society, i.e. θ∗ = θL = x = θ
∗∗ = 1
2
.
Next, we show that when the cost of attendance is relatively small, and
the distribution of the ideal points of the citizens is symmetric around θL we
can completely characterize equilibrium strategies in this case.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium with a Symmetric Distribution) For any
finite number of citizens with distribution of ideal points symmetric around
θL =
1
2
, if c < b, there is an equilibrium in which X = {θi : |θL − θi| > c}
and x = 1
2
.
19When c = b some citizens (or all, depending on the distribution of ideal points of the
population) could be indiﬀerent between attending and not attending the meeting when
nobody else is attending. Existence of equilibrium in this case would depend on how
indiﬀerences are resolved.
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On the one hand, citizens who are close to the legislator’s ideal point
(|θL − θi| < c) become the median if they were to attend, but the improve-
ment of the policy outcome would be less than c. Hence, they prefer to stay
home. On the other hand, citizens who are far away from the legislator’s
ideal point lose more than c from withdrawing. Thus, in this equilibrium all
citizens whose ideal points are more of a distance c away from the legislator’s
ideal point will attend the meeting20. Note that in this extremely symmetric
scenario, our results become a particular case of the result obtained by ORT
for more general utility functions, since in this case the legislator’s ideal point
is equivalent to the default policy of their model.
4.2 Biased legislators, skewed populations
Next we analyze the attendance equilibrium strategies when the ideal point
of the legislator takes values other than 1
2
and the distribution of society’s
preferences is not necessarily symmetric. Recall that we have assumed that
there is at least one citizen with ideal point θi = 0 and at least one citizen with
ideal point θi = 1. Therefore, independently of the shape of the distribution,
the fact that the legislator’s ideal point is away from 1
2
introduces some
asymmetries. In this case, two factors arise as critical: how aligned the
legislator is with society’s preferences and how extremist (in the spatial sense)
she is with respect to 1
2
.
First we analyze the case in which the legislator is relatively extremist
with respect to 1
2
, that is,
¯¯
θL − 12
¯¯
> b − c. In this case we find that for
any distribution of citizens’ ideal points there is an equilibrium in which
the legislator implements the maximal compromise policy on her left if her
ideal point is to the right of 1
2
, and she implements the maximal compromise
policy on her right if her ideal point is to the left of 1
2
. Furthermore, only one
20If there was θi = 12 − c and θi0 =
1
2 + c, in a symmetric equilibrium they both
would have a weak preference to attend, and a weak preference not to attend, in case
both are attending and also in case only one of them attends. Furthermore, if they both
would attend, then in equilibrium all θj /∈
¡
1
2 − c,
1
2 + c
¢
would have a weak preference
for attending. If they both would not attend, then all θj /∈
¡
1
2 − c,
1
2 + c
¢
would have a
strong preference for attending. Thus, in this case there is also an equilibrium in which
only θi = 12 − c and θi0 =
1
2 + c attend.
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citizen attends the meeting in this equilibrium: a leftist one if the legislator
is rightist, and a rightist one if the legislator is leftist.
Proposition 5 (Maximal Compromise Equilibrium) If c < b:
(a) x = θL + b is an equilibrium outcome if and only if θL < 12 − (b− c).
Moreover, only one citizen with ideal policy θi > max {θL + b, 2 (θL + b− c)}
attends.
(b) x = θL−b is an equilibrium outcome if and only if θL > 12+b−c. More-
over, only one citizen with ideal policy θi < min {θL − b, 2 (θL − b+ c)− 1}
attends.
Observe that this result holds for any distribution of the citizens’ ideal
points. When the legislator is extremist, citizens far from the legislator’s ideal
point have a strong incentive to participate. Moreover, one citizen is enough
to induce the maximal compromise. But in this particular case, there is no
response from those citizens who are extremist and close to the legislator
since that maximum compromise is not far enough from them.
With extreme legislators we have thus an equilibrium in which only one
citizen or association attends the meeting. This result can be thought of
as an extreme case of ORT Low participation result. But it also challenges
ORT Non participation of the moderates result: If the legislator preferences
are too extreme, citizens in the center of the political spectrum have strong
incentives to participate and moreover they are able to force her to implement
the maximal compromise outcome in their favor. Note that this type of
equilibria arise even if the legislator’s policy preferences are aligned with the
view of a majority of society.
Observe that the previous Proposition also implies that when the legis-
lator’s policy preferences are not extreme, in the spatial sense, a maximal
compromise policy is never implemented in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 (Moderate legislator) If
¯¯
θL − 12
¯¯
≤ b− c, in equilibrium we
must have x ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) and therefore x (θ∗, θL) = θ∗.
If the legislator is relatively moderate, in equilibrium the choice of the
legislator must be a policy in the interior of the set of implementable policies.
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And given the optimal play of the delegates and the legislator in the contin-
uation of the game, we know that the latter will implement the assembly’s
ideal policy. Moreover, citizens located at both extremes have high stakes in
the meeting, and the policy proposed will be relatively centrist.
Proposition 6 Suppose that c < b and x ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) is the equi-
librium outcome: if i does not attend then θi leaves the same number of
attendees’ ideal points on each side.
In equilibrium, we have two sets of ideologically extreme attendees sepa-
rated by one set of non-attendees. The most preferred policy of the assembly,
according to the median, will always be the average of the two attendees sur-
rounding the set of non-attendees. Let θl = max {θi ∈ X : θi < θ∗ (X)} de-
note the most moderate leftist attendee, and let θr = min {θi ∈ X : θi > θ∗ (X)}
denote the most moderate rightist attendee. Then, the most preferred policy
by the assembly according to the median is given by θ∗ (X) = θl+θr
2
.
Indeed, we can completely characterize the set of citizens who attend
the meeting in equilibrium: exactly all those citizens whose ideal points are
further than c from the policy outcome.
Proposition 7 (Non-participation of the represented) If c < b and
x ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) is the equilibrium outcome, then i attends if and only
if |θi − x| > c.
Since incentives to attend are given by the impact of attendance decisions
on the final outcome, those citizens already represented by the legislator pre-
fer to stay home. Thus, we generalize the result on attendance provided in
ORT. Note that this Proposition and the two previous ones, are generaliza-
tions of Proposition 4 to values of the legislator’s ideal point diﬀerent from
1
2
, and to any distribution of the citizens’ policy preferences.
Observe that the results stated in Propositions 6 and 7 hold for any value
of the legislator’s ideal point. Therefore, the interior equilibrium described
here may exist for any location of the legislator’s ideal point. These results
oﬀer a broader picture of ORT Non participation of the moderates result:
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Those citizens who are already represented by the predicted outcome or by
the legislator’s ideology, have no incentive to participate and will not at-
tend the meeting. But they are not necessarily moderates in the political
spectrum. Interestingly enough, this is consistent with the observed lack of
participation of unions in the Porto Alegre’s Participatory Budgeting process.
Marquetti (2000) argues that one of the reasons explaining this is that union-
ists feel that they are already represented in the Participatory Budgeting by
the leftist leaning of the municipal administration.
Observe that the conditions to be satisfied in an interior equilibrium are
rather strong:
(i) There must be an identical number of attendees on both sides of the set
of non-attendees, so θ∗ (X) = θl+θr
2
;
(ii) All attendees must be at more than a distance c of the policy outcome.
What these two conditions imply is that the existence of an interior equi-
librium will depend largely on the shape of the distribution of the ideal points
of the population. Furthermore, they impose stronger restrictions on the set
of implementable policies.
Proposition 8 If c < b and x ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) is an equilibrium outcome,
then x ∈ (θL − b+ c, θL + b− c) .
Next we show that a necessary condition for existence of an interior equi-
librium for any value of the legislator’s ideal point is that the policy prefer-
ences of the legislator must be aligned with those of society.
Proposition 9 (Alignment is needed ) If c < b and θ∗∗ /∈ (θL − b, θL + b)
then there is no interior equilibrium.
If society’s most preferred policy θ∗∗ does not belong to the set of imple-
mentable policies then an interior equilibrium does not exist. But when it
does, the policy implemented will coincide with the most preferred policy of
the assembly, and will be close to the most preferred policy of society as well.
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Nevertheless, the previous results have a rather negative implication about
existence of this type of equilibrium:
Corollary 2 (Equilibrium existence) If c < b and θ∗∗ /∈ (θL − b, θL + b)
there is no equilibrium when the legislator is moderate. When the legislator
is extremist, maximal compromise is the unique equilibrium.
Therefore, when the preferences of the legislator are relatively moderate,
the alignment between the legislator’s and society’s preferences is a necessary
condition for the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies. The following
example illustrates the non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies when
the median of society is not well aligned with the ideal point of the legislator
and the legislator is moderate.
Example: Non-existence of equilibrium
Consider a society with only three citizens located at 0, 1
3
, and 1. Suppose
that the legislator is located at 3
5
and suppose that b = 1
5
. In this case, the
ideal point of the median cannot be implemented in equilibrium. Suppose
that the cost of attending is c < 1
10
. We will show that there is no pure
strategy equilibrium.
0 1
bd −θ bd +θ
dθ
3
1
Figure 3: Non-Existence of Equilibrium.
It is clear that all citizens want to attend when nobody is attending, since
the attendance cost c is smaller that the impact each one of them has on the
final outcome. If all of them were attending, the median of the assembly
would be 1
3
, and the final outcome θL − b = 25 . Since the legislator will
not compromise beyond that, the citizen located at 1 would be better oﬀ
withdrawing. If the only attendees were the two leftist citizens, any of them
would be better oﬀ not attending. If the two extremist citizens were the ones
attending the meeting, then the citizen at 1
3
would prefer to attend since his
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utility would increase by 1
2
− (θL − b) = 12 −
2
5
= 1
10
> c. Finally, if 1
3
and
1 were the ones to attend, the citizen at 0 would prefer to attend since his
utility would increase by 2
3
− (θL− b) = 23 −
2
5
= 4
15
> 1
10
> c. Hence, there is
no equilibrium in pure strategies.
We have shown that in a system of participatory democracy, citizens,
under certain conditions, may obtain their most preferred policy in equilib-
rium. But we have also shown that otherwise the policy outcomes may imply
instability. Next we characterize general conditions on the distribution of cit-
izens’ ideal points that provide the necessary alignment and guarantee the
existence of an interior equilibrium.
Let us define the set:
S = {x ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) : x = θl(x)+θr(x)2 for some θl (x) and θr (x)
s.t. θl (x) , θr (x) ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) and |{θi : θi ≤ θl (x)}| = |{θi : θi ≥ θr (x)}|}.
From previous results we know that an equilibrium outcome must belong
to the set of implementable policies, [θL − b, θL + b] , and that an interior
equilibrium outcome has to be the average of the ideal points of the two atten-
dees delimiting the set of non-attendees. Thus, the policies contained in S are
all candidates to equilibrium outcomes. Notice that if θ∗∗ /∈ (θL − b, θL + b)
then the set S is empty. The next Proposition derives a suﬃcient condition
under which the elements of S can be implemented in equilibrium.
Proposition 10 If c < b, then for each x ∈ S there exist c (x) and c (x)
such that if c ∈ (c (x) , c (x)), x is an equilibrium outcome.
These condition ensures the stability of the division of citizens into "ex-
treme" sets of attendees separated by a set of non-attendees. It comes from
Proposition 8: the cost should be suﬃciently small to oﬀer to relatively ex-
treme citizens enough incentives to attend the meeting but it must be high
enough to discourage citizens with ideal points relatively close to the equi-
librium policy outcome from attending. In that case, the assembly’s most
preferred policy can be implemented in equilibrium. Recall that in this case
the assembly most preferred policy is close to society’s most preferred policy.
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5 Revisiting Porto Alegre
In this Section, we analyze, in the light of the results obtained above, the
political events witnessed in Porto Alegre since the Participatory Budgeting
experience started. Our claim is that the two types of equilibria characterized
in the previous sections represent two diﬀerent scenarios observed in the city.
One of the main tasks of the popular assemblies in Porto Alegre is to set a
consensual rank of priorities within districts and a list of hierarchical demands
inside each priority. There are a total of thirteen issue areas available: Basic
Sanitation, Land use regulation (that includes Housing policy), Transporta-
tion, Social Service, Education, Health, Paving, City organization, Leisure,
Sports, Culture, Environment and Economic Development.
At the early stages of the implementation of the Participatory Budgeting
system, participation was very low (see Figure 1 below) and the priorities
selected at the assemblies referred to issues of interest to the working classes:
all the investment budget was devoted to cover basic needs. Table 1 displays
the three top priorities selected in the period 1992-2005. It shows that three
areas received the main interest of the population: Paving (that also includes
public illumination and garbage collection), Basic Sanitation (water supply
and sewage disposal) and Land Use Regulation (house production, relocation
of families living in slums). These priorities simply permuted their rankings
in the priority list during the first half of that period.
PavingEducationBasic Sanitation1992
Land use regulationPavingBasic Sanitation1993
Basic SanitationPavingLand use regulation1994
Basic SanitationLand use regulationPaving1995
Land use regulationBasic SanitationPaving1996
Basic SanitationPavingHousing Policy1997
Basic SanitationHousing PolicyPaving1998
Housing PolicyPavingBasic Sanitation1999
HealthPavingHousing Policy2000
Basic SanitationHousingPaving2001
PavingEducationHousing2002
PavingEducationHousing2003
EducationSocial ServicesHousing2004
Social ServicesEducationHousing2005
3rd Priority2nd Priority1st Priority Year
Source: Prefeitura Municipal de Porto Alegre (2005)
Table 1
Total assembly participants in the OP, 1989-1999
3694
7610
11941
20724
16456
1601614267
11247
10735
780 9760
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Year
Figure 1
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In that case, the best interpretation of our unidimensional policy space is
the population’s wealth distribution, as it can be thought as a representation
of the citizens’ preferences over basic needs. When policy preferences are
given by the wealth distribution, the legislator is expected to be extreme
with respect to the population, since elected representatives normally belong
to high-income segments, specially in Brazil where barriers to entry into
politics are important. Our prediction in this case is given by the maximal
compromise equilibrium: very few citizens with preferences opposed to the
legislator’s attend the meeting and they force the legislator to implement a
policy close to their most preferred one.
As a result, the more pressing needs were eﬀectively alleviated: In 1989
in Porto Alegre only 49% of the population was covered by basic sanitation;
this percentage rose to 85% in 1996. Over the same period, the proportion of
households with water supply reached the 99.5% and the number of students
enrolled in elementary schools increased by 190%; five times more housing
units were constructed in the period 1993-96 than in the period 1986-88.21
At later stages of the implementation of the Participatory Budgeting
system, once basic needs had been covered, the priorities selected shifted to
issues that were also attractive to middle class citizens like Education, Health
and Social Services. The composition of the attendance to the meetings
changed: The percentage of participants in assemblies with up to 4 minimum
wages fell from 62% in 1995 to 54% in 2000 (the average household income
in Porto Alegre was thirteen minimum wages in 1998)22. In our model, this
can be thought of as a change of the relevant policy space, and therefore,
as a change in the relevant distribution of the citizens’ preferences. Thus, it
is reasonable to think that the legislator’s policy preferences became more
aligned with those of the population. Our prediction in that case is given
by the interior equilibrium when the policy preferences of the legislator and
21The extent to what these improvements can be attributed to the process of Partici-
patory Budgeting or to the changes in the city goverment is still subject to debate. But
the evidence shows that they took place against the overall trend in Brazil as a whole (see
Marquetti, (2000) and the mentioned report by the Inter-Amercican Development Bank
(2003)).
22See Marquetti (2000) and CIDADE (2002).
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those of the society are aligned: Participation is expected to be higher and
the policy implemented should be close to the most preferred policy by the
assembly. The political scenario in Porto Alegre seems to confirm this, as
suggested by: 1) the rising figures of participants (see Figure 1), and 2) the
surveys on the citizens’ level of satisfaction with the process: in 1995, 60.3%
of the citizens replied that the people who participate in the process either
"always" or "most of the time" were decisive on public policies; in 2002 this
percentage rose to the 69% (CIDADE, 2002).
Casual evidence also shows a pattern of confrontation within assemblies
that resembles the opposition of blocks of extremists that characterize the
interior equilibrium of our model. Santos (1998) reports, that once the lack
of physical infrastructures was attenuated, there were increasing levels of
conflict of interests (regarding culture and leisure issues) between the par-
ticipants at the early (regional) meetings, typically coming from low income
groups, and those who attend the later (thematic) meetings, more educated
and wealthy.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a model of participatory democracy inspired
by the system of participatory budgeting implemented in the city of Porto
Alegre. This experiment, now extended to many other cities worldwide,
shows that a participatory system at the local level is indeed possible and
can successfully, but not without problems, govern large communities.
We have analyzed participatory democracy by introducing a legislator,
with the role of policy implementation, in a formal model of direct democracy,
and we have shown that this political system is characterized by a relative
autonomy between citizens and the legislator: the former will not be able to
implement any policy, and the latter has to acquire calculated compromises.
We have found two diﬀerent kinds of equilibria: a maximal compromise
equilibrium and an interior equilibrium. The former equilibrium always exists
when the preferences of the legislator are extreme with respect to the pol-
icy space. In this equilibrium only one citizen (or community association),
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with preferences opposed to those of the legislator’s, attends the meeting and
the policy outcome is relatively moderate. An interior equilibrium only ex-
ists when the preferences of the legislator are aligned with the majoritarian
views of the population. This equilibrium may exist with an ideologically
extreme or moderate legislator, but only for a certain subset of distributions
of citizens’ ideal points. In this equilibrium the policy implemented is the
most preferred by the assembly and it is close to the policy most preferred
by society. The number of attendees depends on the distribution of the pref-
erences of society, and the composition of the assembly is characterized by
two groups of equal size and opposed preferences.
The evidence from Porto Alegre can be explained by these two diﬀerent
scenarios: the lack of alignment between citizens and representatives concern-
ing basic needs could have induced the low levels of participation observed
at first, as predicted by our maximal compromise equilibrium. When the
population demands shifted from basic infrastructures, alignment increased
and, as predicted by our interior equilibrium, both the level of participa-
tion and of confrontation among citizens rose; moreover, the policies finally
implemented seemed to match better the citizens’ proposals.
One natural question about the robustness of our results refers to our
assumption on the legislator’s probability of reelection. But the two kinds
of equilibria obtained are not an artifact of our specification. For instance,
suppose that the continuous function P (x∗, x) = 1 − (x− x∗)2 represents
the probability with which the legislator is reelected as a function of the
assembly’s proposal and of the implemented policy. It is easy to show
that the optimal decision of the legislator given a policy proposal x∗ is
x = (1− α)x∗ + αθL. And given the optimal choice of the delegates we
have that the policy implemented in equilibrium will be always in a neigh-
borhood of the legislator’s ideal point: [αθL, (1 + α) θL]. In particular, for
θ∗ < θL in equilibrium we will have x = θ
∗ whenever θ∗ ≥ αθL; and x = αθ∗
whenever θ∗ < αθL. Similarly, for θ∗ > θL in equilibrium we will have x = θ∗
whenever θ∗ ≤ (1 + α) θL; and x = (1 + α) θ∗ whenever θ∗ > (1 + α) θL.
Thus, the results are qualitative identical to the ones we obtain with the
step function. Therefore, the discontinuity obtained in our characterization
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of equilibria is not implied by the probability of reelection we employ but
rather by the non-alignment of preferences between legislator and society.
Another question refers to the plausibility of having a legislator whose
preferences are not aligned with society’s. It may seem natural to expect
that only the legislators with desirable preferences will be selected in the
long run, so alignment will be ultimately achieved. This would probably
be the case under perfect competition in the political arena. But in the
market of political candidates, barriers to entry abound. It is very rare
for representatives to come from average or below-average income levels.
Entering political competition often entails some costs, mostly financial. If
preferences over policies are given by wealth, then it is not reasonable to
expect preferences within the pool of potential candidates to be similar to
those of the society as a whole.
Two final remarks are in order. The main institutional features of par-
ticipatory democracy may seem striking at first glance: only the opinions
of those who participate at the meetings are taken into account. On the
contrary, in a representative democracy everybody’s opinion can be heard
through the simple act of voting (surely, casting a vote is cheaper than at-
tending an assembly). This comparison is misleading for two reasons: First,
as mentioned, many of the participants in the assemblies are representing
families or communities associations so it is not correct to think that only a
few thousand opinions are heard. Another reason is that, as the low level of
turnout in Western democracies indicates, this alleged advantage of represen-
tative democracy is doubtful: it is well known that the fraction of population
systematically disenfranchised from the representative processes are the less
educated and wealthy, precisely those segments overwhelmingly represented
at the assemblies in Porto Alegre (see Appendix 1).
Finally, our model is not able to generate enough observables that would
allow us to perform comparisons between diﬀerent political systems. An
avenue for further research would be to relax some of the assumptions of the
model in order to be able to perform these comparisons. In Brazil, almost
two-hundred municipalities have adopted a Participatory Budgeting process
but they are still a minority. There is certainly room for applying the present
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model to the ongoing research comparing economic performances across these
cities and over time.
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A Appendix 1: Participatory Budgeting in
Porto Alegre
During the last decade, Participatory Budgeting has been implemented in
more than one hundred Brazilian cities, including some state capitals such as
Porto Alegre (with a population of 1.4 million inhabitants), Belo Horizonte
(2 million) and Recife (1.5 million). There are two elements that explain
the introduction of this system in Brazil during this period: 1) the new
Brazilian Constitution of 1988 that modified the balance of political power
in the country and signalled a political and administrative decentralization,
and 2) the increasing number of active community associations that were
politically involved.
Porto Alegre’s system of Participatory Budgeting (Orçamento Participa-
tivo), referred to as OP, is the best known and most successful experiment
of local management based on participatory democracy. It was introduced
in 1989 when the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT henceforth)
won the local elections23.
The OP is a pyramidal system whose main elements are: the regional and
thematic assemblies, the Fora of Delegates, and the Council of the OP (COP).
Regional assemblies, called rodadas, take place in each of the sixteen regions
of the city during April and May. These assemblies are the principal forums
for popular participation; they are totally open and any citizen may attend
them. In these meetings, each region evaluates the executive’s performance,
defines its priorities and demands, and elects delegates for the Forum of
Delegates and councillors for the COP. Prior to the rodada, preparatory
meetings organized by the community take place.24
23The description of Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre builds on Santos (1998)
and Marquetti (2000) and (2003).
24Until 2002 there were two rounds of rodadas; the second round was supressed because
32
Public scrutiny and control of the municipal government is the main issue
at the early meetings. The municipality accounts for the implementation of
the previous year Investment Plan. In the ensuing meetings, discussions focus
on setting a consensual regional rank of priorities and a list of hierarchical
demands inside each priority. Each region selects five out of the mentioned
thirteen issue areas available. All decisions are taken by majority rule. The
choices of each region are ranked according to three criteria: lack of the
service or infrastructure, population, and regional and city ranking of the
priority.
Thematic assemblies (tematicas) take place along with the rodada and
cover six areas (Health and Social Welfare, Transportation and Circulation,
City Organization and Urban Development, Culture and Leisure, Education
and Economic Development and Taxation). Participation depends on the
interest that citizens might have in the area. Decisions are also taken by
majority rule.
The Fora of Delegates is formed by about one thousand delegates. They
are elected during the popular meetings according to criteria based on the
number of participants. Their role is to serve as intermediaries between the
COP and the citizens. They supervise the implementation of the budget
and inform the population. Delegates are typically leaders of community
organizations, so citizens not integrated in these structures are hardly elected.
Finally, the COP is a body composed of 44 councilors: two councilors
for each region assembly (32), two for each thematic assembly (10), one
representative of the Residents Association Union of Porto Alegre, and one
from the City Hall’s Attendants Labor Union. It is constituted in July of
each year and its role is to design and submit to the city government a
detailed budget proposal based on the priorities determined in the regional
assemblies, and to monitor the execution of the approved public works.
The OP is an example of participatory democracy because it reconciles di-
rect democracy, embedded in associations and meetings, and representative
democracy at the urban level. Assemblies coexist with two elected bodies
who hold the formal municipal power: The Mayoralty or executive body
it was increasingly seen as redundant.
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(Prefeitura) and the Chamber of Deputies or legislative body (Câmara de
Vereadores). The COP submits the budget proposal to the Chamber of
Deputies who has total autonomy to amend or defeat it. However, since the
proposal has been approved by citizens, assemblies, and community organi-
zations, the political cost of turning it down is very high, and the Chamber
has never done it.
The relationship between the "formal" elected representatives and popu-
lar movements has not been without problems. In fact, the conflict between
them has been one of the main political issues in Porto Alegre. On the one
hand, the OP has been criticized because the PT community leaders seem
to have helped the party to "capture" the process by making regions’ po-
litical agenda fit into the PT’s one. On the other hand, the executive has
been accused of abusing its privileged position when resorting to "technical
reasons" in order to challenge the budget proposal; councillors and delegates
have reported that they have been denied relevant information by the city
technical staﬀ in some occasions. This problem was serious enough to prompt
the COP to start training seminars.
Nevertheless, the city has witnessed a remarkable improvement regarding
the behavior of the politicians and community leaders who, as in the rest
of Brazil, were used to clientelism. Now, the city councilors and potential
candidates face a more informed population and more politicized grass-root
organizations, so there is little space for the "gift exchange" that charac-
terizes clientelism and corruption. The high degree of accountability of the
administration has reduced corruption and rent seeking behavior.
One remarkable success of the OP has been the massive participation
of those segments of the population typically disengaged from the institu-
tions of representative democracy. This can be seen in Figure 2 showing
the income profile of both participants and inhabitants of Porto Alegre. A
large majority of participants in the OP structures has a household income
below the average. Since the average household income in Porto Alegre in
1998 was thirteen minimum wages (Marquetti, 2000), it becomes clear that
the less wealthy citizens are overrepresented in the OP. Results regarding the
education level of the participants follow the same pattern: 56.5% of the par-
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ticipants have completed less than 8 years of schooling. Finally, middle-class
segments participate more in the OP at higher levels, so the composition of
the COP is closer to a random sample of the population.
Income profile of participants in the OP
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B Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Implementable Policies in Equilibrium.
In order to find the policies implemented by the legislator in equilibrium
we combine the optimal choice functions of the legislator and the assembly.
x (x∗) =



x∗ +B if B ≤ |x∗ − θL| ≤ b+B and x∗ ≤ θL
x∗ −B if B ≤ |x∗ − θL| ≤ b+B and x∗ ≥ θL
θL otherwise
x∗ (θ∗) =



θL − b−B if θ∗ ≤ θL − b
θ∗ −B if θL − b ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL
θ∗ +B if θL ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL + b
θL + b+B if θL + b ≤ θ∗
We have to consider four diﬀerent cases:
(i) if θ∗ ≤ θL − b, then the best response of the assembly is to propose
x∗ = θL−b−B. In this case, θL−x∗ = b+B and x∗ ≤ θL, thus the legislator
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implements x = x∗ +B = θL − b.
(ii) if θL − b ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL, then the best response of the assembly is to
propose x∗ = θ∗−B. In this case, B = θ∗−x∗ ≤ θL−x∗ = θL−θ∗+B ≤ b+B
and x∗ ≤ θL, thus the legislator implements x = x∗ +B = θ∗.
(iii) if θL ≤ θ∗ ≤ θL + b, then the best response of the assembly is to
propose x∗ = θ∗+B. In this case, B = x∗−θ∗ ≤ x∗−θL = θ∗+B−θL ≤ b+B
and x∗ ≥ θL, thus the legislator implements x = x∗ −B = θ∗.
(iv) if θL + b ≤ θ∗, then the best response of the assembly is to propose
x∗ = θL+b+B. In this case, θL−x∗ = b+B and x∗ ≥ θL, thus the legislator
implements x = x∗ −B = θL + b.
Therefore, in equilibrium the legislator will implement the most preferred
policy of the assembly only when it belongs to the interval [θL − b, θL + b],
otherwise the only policies that will be implemented in equilibrium are θL−
b, θL + b. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Non Attendance.
First we show that when c > b there is an equilibrium in which nobody
attends the meeting.
Suppose that nobody attends the meeting. In this case the legislator
will implement her ideal point, thus x = θL. Consider a citizen i such that
θi ≤ θL − b. Since he does not attend the meeting his payoﬀ is Vi(θL, 0) =
− |θL − θi| = θi − θL. If he were to attend, he would be the only partic-
ipant. Since his ideal point is not within the interval [θL − b, θL + b] the
best he could obtain is x = θL − b, thus his payoﬀ would be Vi(θL − b, 1) =
− |θL − b− θi| − c = θi − θL + b − c. Since c > b we have that Vi(θL, 0) >
Vi(θL − b, 1), so he is better oﬀ not attending.
Now consider a citizen i such that θL − b ≤ θi ≤ θL. Since he does not
attend the meeting his payoﬀ is Vi(θL, 0) = − |θL − θi|. If he were to attend,
he would be the only participant. Since his ideal point is within the interval
[θL − b, θL + b] he would be able to obtain his ideal point θi as the policy
output, thus his payoﬀ would be: Vi(θi, 1) = − |θi − θi| − c = −c. Since
c > b > |θL − θi|, we have that Vi(θL, 0) = − |θL − θi| > Vi(θi, 1) = −c, so he
is better oﬀ not attending. Using a symmetric argument we can also prove
that all citizens with θi ≥ θL are better oﬀ not attending the meeting when
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nobody else is attending.
Next we will show that nobody attending the meeting is the unique equi-
librium of the game when c > b.
Let x (X) = x (θ∗ (X)) denote the policy implemented as a function of the
set of citizens who attend the meeting, X, given that citizens and legislator
are playing their best responses, the last two stages of the game.
Observe that for any set of attendees in equilibriumX, and for any θi ∈ X
we must have that Vi(x (X) , 1) = − |x (X)− θi|− c > Vi(x (X − {θi}) , 0) =
− |x (X − {θi})− θi| , that is |x (X)− x (X − {θi})| > c. Since x ∈ [θL − b, θL + b]
we have that:
(i) If θi ≤ θL, this condition implies that θL−b ≤ x (X) ≤ θL+b−c < θL.
(ii) If θi ≥ θL, this condition implies that θL < θL−b+c ≤ x (X) ≤ θL+b.
These two conditions cannot hold simultaneously. These implies that in
equilibriumwemust have that eitherX = {θi : θi ≤ θL} orX = {θi : θi ≥ θL} .
Suppose that X = {θi : θi ≤ θL} , then since all θi ≥ θL do not attend the
meeting we must have that x (X) ≤ θL and x (X − {θi}) ≤ θL for all
θi ∈ X. But this implies that |x (X)− x (X − {θi})| < b < c which contra-
dicts the condition that makes attendance optimal. Similarly we can prove
that X = {θi : θi ≥ θL} leads to a contradiction. Therefore, if c > b there
cannot be an equilibrium in which some citizens attend.¥
Proof of Proposition 3: Attendance in Equilibrium.
We will show that if nobody attends the meeting any citizen with ideal
point θi such that |θi − θL| > c would be better oﬀ attending the meeting.
Since we have assumed that there is at least a citizen with θi = 0 and at
least a citizen with θi = 1, we will always have someone that has a profitable
deviation. Suppose that c < b and nobody attends the meeting, that is,
X = ∅. Consider a citizen with θi such that b > |θL − θi| > c. Since he
does not attend the meeting his payoﬀ is Vi(θL, 0) = − |θL − θi|. If he were
to attend, he would be the only participant. Since his ideal point is within
the interval [θL − b, θL + b] he would be able to obtain his ideal point θi as
the policy output, thus his payoﬀ would be Vi(θi, 1) = − |θi − θi| − c = −c.
Since c < |θL − θi|, we have that Vi(θL, 0) = − |θL − θi| < Vi(θi, 1) = −c.
Therefore, he would be better oﬀ attending.
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Now consider a citizen with θi such that θi ≤ θL − b. Since he does not
attend the meeting his payoﬀ is Vi(θL, 0) = − |θL − θi| = θi−θL. If he were to
attend, he would be the only participant. Since his ideal point is not within
the interval [θL − b, θL + b] the best policy he could obtain is x = θL−b, thus
his payoﬀ would be Vi(θL− b, 1) = − |θL − b− θi|− c = θi− θL+ b− c. Since
c < b we have that Vi(θL, 0) < Vi(θL − b, 1). Therefore, he would be better
oﬀ attending.
Similarly we can prove that any citizen with θi ≥ θL + b would be better
oﬀ attending the meeting. Therefore, nobody attending the meeting cannot
be an equilibrium.¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Symmetric Equilibrium.
We are assuming that F (θi) is symmetric around θL = 12 and c < b. We
will show that there is a symmetric equilibrium in whichX = {θi : |θi − θL| > c} ,
by proving that all θi ∈ X are better oﬀ attending and all θi /∈ X are better
oﬀ not attending.
Suppose that X = {θi : |θi − θL| > c} and consider a citizen θi ∈ X
such that θi < 12 − c. Since he attends the meeting his payoﬀ is Vi(
1
2
, 1) =
−
¯¯
θi − 12
¯¯
− c = θi − 12 − c. If he would not attend his utility would be
Vi(x (X − {θi}) , 0) = − |θi − x (X − {θi})| = θi − x (X − {θi}) . Thus he is
better oﬀ attending if and only if x (X − {θi}) > 12 + c. We will show that
this is always the case.
Since x (X − {θi}) = min
©
θ∗ (X − {θi}) , 12 + b
ª
, and we have that θ∗ (X − {θi}) =
median (X − {θi}) > 12+c and b > c, then we must have that x (X − {θi}) >
1
2
+ c.
Now consider a citizen θi /∈ X such that 12 − c < θi <
1
2
. Since he
does not attend his utility is Vi(12 , 0) = −
¯¯
θi − 12
¯¯
= θi − 12 . If he was to
attend he would obtain Vi(x (X ∪ {θi}) , 1) = − |θi − x (X ∪ {θi})|− c = −c
since in this case he would become the median of the assembly, that is,
θ∗ (X ∪ {θi}) = median (X ∪ {θi}) = θi and since θi ∈ [θL − b, θL + b] his
ideal point would be implemented x (X ∪ {θi}) = θi. Thus, he is better oﬀ
not attending because 1
2
− c < θi.¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Maximal Compromise equilibrium.
We will only prove part (a). The proof of part (b) is almost identical and
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is left to the reader.
First we show that if x (X) = θL + b is the equilibrium outcome, then X
must be a singleton. Suppose that the equilibrium outcome is x (X) = θL+b.
Then for all θi ∈ X such that θi < θL−b we have that x (X − {θi}) = x (X),
therefore we must have that Vi (x (X − {θi}) , 0) > Vi (x (X) , 1). Therefore,
they would be better oﬀ not attending and in equilibrium we must have that
X ⊆ {θi : θi ≥ θL + b} .
Given that, for all θi ∈ X such that θi ≥ θL + b we have that
x (X − {θi}) =
(
x (X) if |X| > 1
θL if |X| = 1
This implies that Vi (x (X − {θi}) , 0) > Vi (x (X) , 1) as long as |X| >
1. Therefore, they would be better oﬀ not attending as long as |X| > 1.
Therefore, the only possibility for equilibrium is |X| = 1.
Next we show that there is an equilibrium with x (X) = θL + b iﬀ θL <
1
2
−b+c.We already know that if x (X) = θL+b is the equilibrium outcome,
we must have X = {θi} with θi ≥ θL + b. Observe that if a citizen θi with
θi ≥ θL + b is the only citizen who attends the meeting his best proposal
is x∗ = θL + b + B, the policy implemented is x = θL + b and he obtains
Vi (θL + b, 1) = − |θi − θL − b|−c = θL+b−θi−c. If he was not to attend he
would obtain Vi (θL, 0) = − |θi − θL| = θL−θi. Thus he is better oﬀ attending
since b > c.
Suppose that X = {θi} with θi ≥ θL + b. Observe that for any θj ≥
θL + b, θj 6= θi we have that x (X ∪ {θj}) = θL + b, thus they would gain
nothing by attending, and they would have to pay the cost. Therefore, they
are all better oﬀ not attending.
Now consider a θj with θj < θL + b. If we show that θj = 0 prefers not
to attend the meeting, we will have that all θj < θL+ b prefer not to attend.
If θj = 0, if he does not attend the meeting he obtains V0 (x (X) , 0) =
− |θL + b| = −θL − b; if he were to attend the policy outcome would be
x (X ∪ {0}) = max©θi
2
, θL − b
ª
and thus he would obtain
V0 (x (X ∪ {0}) , 1) = −
¯¯¯¯
max
½
θi
2
, θL − b
¾¯¯¯¯
− c = −max
½
θi
2
, θL − b
¾
− c
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We have that he is better oﬀ not attending iﬀ−θL−b > −max
©
θi
2
, θL − b
ª
−
c iﬀ θL + b− c < max
©
θi
2
, θL − b
ª
.
Notice that if max
©
θi
2
, θL − b
ª
= θL − b the inequality is never satis-
fied. Thus it is necessary and suﬃcient that we have θi
2
> θL + b − c, that
is θi > 2 (θL + b− c). And there would be such a citizen if and only if
2 (θL + b− c) < 1 iﬀ θL < 12 − b+ c.
Thus we have shown that there is an equilibrium with x (X) = θL + b
iﬀ θL < 12 − b + c. And in this equilibrium we have that X = {θi} with
θi > max {θL + b, 2 (θL + b− c) .} .
Similarly we could show that there is an equilibrium with x (X) = θL− b
iﬀ θL > 12 + b− c. And in this equilibrium we would have that X = {θi} with
θi < min {θL − b, 2 (θL − b+ c)− 1} .¥
Proof of Proposition 6: Symmetric Attendance.
This result is directly implied by the two following lemmata with their
symmetric counterparts.
Lemma 1: For any distribution of citizens’ ideal points, if c < b, the
equilibrium outcome satisfies x (X) ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) , and there is a θi <
x (X) (or a θi > x (X)) that is not attending, then he must leave either the
same number of attendees at each side or one more attendee to her right
(left).
Proof of Lemma 1:
Suppose that θi < x (X) is not attending, and there are k attendees on
her left and k + l attendees on her right with l > 1. Let θ1, ..., θl denote the
first l attendees on the right of θi, then x (X) = median (θ1, ..., θl) .
Suppose that l is odd. Then we have that x (X) = θ l+1
2
and x (X ∪ θi) =
x
³
X − θ l+1
2
+1
´
= max
½
θ l+1
2 −1
+θ l+1
2
2
, θL − b
¾
.But we need x (X)−x
³
X − θ l+1
2
+1
´
>
c because θ l+1
2
+1 is attending, and x (X) − x (X ∪ θi) < c because θi is not
attending. Therefore we have a contradiction .
Now suppose that l is even. Then we have that x (X) =
θ l
2
+θ l
2+1
2
and
x (X ∪ θi) = x
³
X − θ l
2
+1
´
= max
n
θ l
2
, θL − b
o
. But we need x (X)−x
³
X − θ l
2
+1
´
>
c because θ l
2
+1 is attending, and x (X)− x (X ∪ θi) < c because θi is not at-
tending. Therefore we have a contradiction. Thus, we have proved that in
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equilibrium we must have l ≤ 1.¥
Lemma 2: For any distribution of citizens’ ideal points, if c < b, the
equilibrium outcome satisfies x (X) ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) , and there is a θi <
x (X) that is not attending, then all θj such that θi < θj ≤ x (X) are not
attending.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Suppose that θi < x (X) is not attending and there is a θj with θi ≤
θj < x (X) that is attending. By the previous lemma θi must leave either k
attendees on both sides or k attendees to his left and k + 1 attendees to his
right.
In the first case, it implies that θj must leave k attendees to his left and
k−1 attendees to his right. Which would imply that x (X) = median (X) <
θj. A contradiction since θj < x (X).
In the second case, it implies that θj must leave k attendees to his left and
k attendees to his right. Which would imply that x (X) = median (X) = θj.
A contradiction since θj < x (X).¥
Proof of Proposition 7: Non-participation of the represented.
We will show that if any θi < x (X)− c does not attend the meeting, the
equilibrium conditions are not satisfied. A similar reasoning can be used to
show the symmetric counterpart for any θi > x (X)− c.
Suppose that there is a θi /∈ X such that θL − b < θi < x (X) − c. His
utility is Vi (x (X) , 0) = − |θi − x (X)| = θi − x (X) < −c. Since he is not
attending the meeting, by Proposition 6 there must be half of the attendees’
ideal points to his right and half to his left θi. If he was to attend he would
become the median of the attendees and x (X ∪ {θi}) = θi, thus his utility
would be Vi (x (X ∪ {θi}) , 1) = − |θi − x (X ∪ {θi})|− c = −c. Therefore, he
would be better oﬀ attending, and this is a contradiction.
Now suppose that there is a θi /∈ X such that θi < θL − b < x (X) − c.
His utility is Vi (x (X) , 0) = − |θi − x (X)| = θi − x (X) and since he is
not attending the meeting, by Proposition 6 he must also have that half of
the attendees’ ideal points to his right and half to his left. Thus, if he was to
attend he would become the median of the attendees and x (X ∪ {θi}) = θL−
b. Thus his utility would be Vi (x (X ∪ {θi}) , 1) = − |θi − x (X ∪ {θi})|−c =
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θi− (θL − b)− c > θi− (x (X)− c)− c = θi−x (X) . Therefore, he would be
better oﬀ attending, and this is a contradiction.¥
Proof of Proposition 8:
Suppose that x (X) ∈ (θL − b, θL + b) . From Proposition 6 we know that
we must have x (X) = θl+θr
2
for some θl and θr that are attending the meeting.
Since θl and θr are attending the meeting, by Proposition 7 we must also have
that θl, θr /∈ (x (X)− c, x (X) + c) .
Since θr is attending his utility is Vr (x (X) , 1) = − |θr − x (X)| − c =
x (X)−θr−c. If θr was not attending, θl would be the median of the attendees,
thus θ∗ (X − {θr}) = θl. Since θl ≤ x (X)−c < θL−b we have that the policy
that legislator would implement in this case is x (X − {θr}) = θL − b. Thus
his utility in this case would be Vr (x (X − {θr}) , 0) = − |θr − θL + b| =
θL− b−θr. Since we assumed that x (X)− c < θL− b, we have that θr would
be better oﬀ not attending the meeting, which is a contradiction. Similarly
we can prove that in equilibrium we must have x (X) + c < θL + b. ¥
Proof of Proposition 9: Alignment is needed.
By Proposition 7 we know that in equilibrium all citizens with ideal points
to the left of x (X) − c will attend, and by Proposition 8 we know that
θL − b < x (X)− c. This implies that when θ∗∗ < θL − b we have more than
half of the population to the left of x (X)− c, and they are all attending the
meeting. Combining Propositions 7 and 8 there should be exactly half of the
attendees to the left of x (X)− c. This is a contradiction. ¥
Proof of Proposition 10:
Suppose that x ∈ S, that is, x = θr+θl
2
for some θl and θr such that
|{θi : θi ≤ θl}| = |{θi : θi ≥ θr}| . Observe that if θl and θr attend the meeting
their payoﬀs are VR (x (X) , 1) = VL (x (X) , 1) = θl−θr2 − c. If one of them
decides not to attend his payoﬀ is Vi (x (X − {θi}) , 0) = θl− θr for i = L,R.
Thus, in order to have both citizens attending in equilibrium we must have
θl−θr
2
− c > θl − θr. Hence we need c to satisfy the following condition c <
c = θr−θl
2
. Observe that c < b. If θl and θr are attending, then all the other
citizens such that either θi ≤ θl or θi ≥ θr are better oﬀ attending.
Next we will show that all citizens such that θl < θi < θr, are better
oﬀ not attending the meeting: Let θl+1 denote the ideal point of the voter
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next to θl on his right and let θr−1 denote the ideal point of the voter next
to θr on his left. If they are not attending the meeting their payoﬀs are
VL+1 (x (X) , 0) = −
¯¯
θl+1 − θl+θr2
¯¯
and VR−1 (x (X) , 0) = −
¯¯
θr−1 − θl+θr2
¯¯
. If
one of them decides to attend his payoﬀs is Vi (x (X ∪ {θi}) , 1) = −c for
i = l + 1, r − 1. Thus, in order to have both not attending in equilibrium
we must have
¯¯
θl+1 − θl+θr2
¯¯
< c and
¯¯
θr−1 − θl+θr2
¯¯
< c. Hence we need c to
satisfy the following condition c > c = max
©¯¯
θl+1 − θl+θr2
¯¯
,
¯¯
θr−1 − θl+θr2
¯¯ª
.
Observe that 0 ≤ c < c. If θl+1 and θr−1 are better oﬀ not attending, then so
are all the other citizens such that either θi ∈ [θl+1, θr−1]. Thus, if c ∈ (c, c)
there is an equilibrium with X = {θi : θi ≤ θl} ∪ {θi : θi ≥ θr} and x (X) =
θr+θl
2
. ¥
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